△중동 질서를 바꾸려 들었던 최근 미국 정권들의 실패
1. 90년대 클린턴 정부 - 친미 정권 경제협력(이란 배제)으로 "신 중동" 만들기 → 실패
2. 9.11이후 부시 정부 - 이라크 사담 후세인 정권 축출로 민주주의 확산 기도 → 실패
(되레 이란 부상, 이라크 내 원리주의 세력, 하마스·헤즈볼라 등 강화)
※오바마는 이란에 대해 고립보다는 대화가 중요하다는 점 깨닫고 있어. 아랍-이스라엘 평화협상에도 적절히 겸손한 자세
△중동의 역학질서는 군사적인 게 아니라 정치적인 것
-작은 나라 정치판에서 큰 나라들이 얼마나 영향력을 행사하는가의 문제가 중요. 작은 나라는 외세가 개입해도 막지 못하는 이라크,레바논,팔레스타인 등, 큰 나라는 이집트,이란,이스라엘,사우디,시리아,터키 등 가리켜. 돈으로 총으로 이념으로 벌어지는 싸움
-이런 면에서 보면 이란의 역내 영향력은 막강 수준. 이라크 최근 지방선거에서 가장 친이란 성향인 이슬람최고위원회(ISC)는 비록 많은 의석 못 얻었지만, 이란 끈 닿아있는 알말리키 총리 정당이나 알사드르 정당은 모두 강력한 정당. 이란 동맹인 하마스나 헤즈볼라도 이스라엘과 전쟁에서 살아남아 영향력 행세
△중동에서 주도권 쥐려던 시도의 잇따른 실패사
-2차대전 뒤 요르단·이라크의 하셈왕조, 아랍 통일 의도로 시리아 정치와 팔레스타인 사회에 아랍민족주의 조장
-50년대 말에는 이집트 나세르 대통령이 아랍민족주의, 반이스라엘 정서 내세워 대립각 세워. 시리아,이집트 합치고 이라크 친서방 정권 무너뜨리면서 아랍공화국연합(UAR) 태어나면서 언뜻 성공하는 듯 했지만 반-나세르 연합도 태어났고 67년 이스라엘 전쟁에서 패하면서 끝
-79년 샤왕조 몰아낸 호메이니는 이슬람혁명이 전 아랍으로 퍼져나갈 것을 기대. 레바논 헤즈볼라 등 성공 사례도 있었지만, 어디서도 이슬람혁명은 나타나지 않아 실패
-90년대 초 걸프전에서 사담후세인도 이슬람주의 성격의 아랍민족주의로 반-후세인 아랍국가에 불안 조성하려 했으나 실패
△미국이 얻어야 할 교훈은?
1.지역에서 주도권 행세하려는 건 미국만 있는 게 아니다. 이란도 역내 주도권을 쥐기는 힘들 것. 그러니 이란의 움직임에 오버하지 말 것.
2.약소국을 무대로 하는 파워게임에서 이란에 밀리는 게 사실. 현지 정권 강화에 힘쓸 것. 이라크 알말리키 총리가 1년 전에 견줘 주요 정치인으로 볼 수 있게 된 게 중요한 예
3.아랍-이스라엘 평화협상에 관심 가질 것. 이란은 팔레스타인 상황을 친미정권 비난에 효율적으로 사용. 팔레스타인 자치정부 강화가 좋은 방법일 것이나, 하마스-파타 분열 심각해 시리아 통하는 게 옳을 듯. 시리아는 이스라엘과도 터키 통해 협상중. 시리아-이란 거리두기에 성공해 "분열도 가치가 있다"는 이란 주장 신뢰도 떨어뜨려야.
- <포린어페어스> 09.02.24. "옛 중동의 귀환"
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The Return of the Old Middle East
How to Win at Balance-of-Power Politics
F. Gregory Gause III
February 24, 2009
F. GREGORY GAUSE III is Professor of Political Science at University of Vermont, Kuwait Foundation Visiting Professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and a Fulbright Scholar at the American University in Kuwait.
As the United States has learned from its failures at transforming the Middle East, old-fashioned balance-of-power politics are once again driving events in the region.
In the 1990s, the Clinton administration hoped that settling the Arab-Israeli conflict would stabilize the region by marginalizing Iran and strengthening pro-American regimes, from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. In turn, the theory went, this would lead to unprecedented economic cooperation among states in the region and the emergence of what Shimon Peres, Israel's prime minister in 1995-96 and its president today, called a "new Middle East." The diagnosis was not bad, but the treatment did not work, and the patient remained as sick as ever.
Then, in the wake of 9/11, the Bush administration developed its own grand design for the region. The centerpiece of the plan was to replace the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq with a thriving democracy. A successful U.S. intervention in Iraq was supposed to intimidate anti-American actors in the Middle East, start a democratic chain reaction throughout the region, encourage Arab-Israeli peace, and reduce the threat of terrorist attacks against the United States.
But despite some modest successes, the Bush administration's "forward strategy of freedom" -- much like Clinton's efforts at engagement -- ultimately failed to remake the Middle East. As Iraq became weaker, Iran grew stronger and both the fundamentalist parties within Iraq and Islamic groups elsewhere, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, gained political ground.
The Obama administration seems to have more realistic goals in the Middle East. The new team realizes that the Iranian leadership has to be engaged rather than isolated in the hope that it might just go away. The Obama administration seems appropriately humble about the prospects for achieving Arab-Israeli peace but also determined to try.
All this is sensible, but to best secure U.S. interests in the Middle East, the new administration needs to remind itself of the rules of the local game -- the traditional contest for influence among regional states. It is played out more in political terms than in military ones, although the possibility of violence is never far. The players are the stronger regional powers (Egypt, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey) and the playing fields are the weaker powers (Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories) whose governments cannot prevent outsiders from interfering in domestic politics. The tools of influence are money, guns, and ideology -- and the scorecard is judged by the political orientations of the weaker states.
By this metric, Iran is doing rather well. In Iraq, its influence is greater than that of any other regional power. Iran's closest Iraqi ally, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, did not do well in recent provincial elections, but Tehran's ties to the political party of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki and to the Sadrist movement, a Shia party built around Muqtada al-Sadr -- both of which fared better in provincial elections -- remain strong. Meanwhile, Hamas, Iran's longtime client, emerged from this winter's war against Israeli forces in Gaza bloodied but unbowed, much as Iran's ally Hezbollah did from its own war with Israel in 2006. Hamas and Hezbollah now dictate the course of politics in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon, respectively -- far more so than the central governments controlled by "moderate" Arabs with pro-Western inclinations.
Still, the game is far from over. In fact, it never ends. After World War II, the Hashemite kings of Iraq and Jordan hoped to unite the Arab world under their leadership. They played politics in Syria and among Palestinians to garner support for Arab nationalism. In the late 1950s, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser used Arab nationalism and a confrontational stance toward Israel to rally Arab public opinion behind his leadership and pressure Arab governments to do his will. Nasser looked to be a winner when he united Syria and Egypt in the United Arab Republic and helped cause the downfall of Iraq's pro-Western monarchy. But regional alliances soon formed to balance against him, and eventually, Egypt's defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War fully ended Nasser's regional appeal.
After the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini hoped that the Islamic Revolution would spread beyond Iran's borders. He had some luck in Lebanon -- where Iran created Hezbollah after the Israeli invasion of 1982 -- and elsewhere. But Khomeini's revolution had limited appeal, and ultimately, no Arab government fell to a sister revolution. Saddam, who played an important role in checking Iran's power, learned a similar lesson during the first Gulf War in the early 1990s. He combined Arab nationalism with Islamism to try to create instability in Arab states that had joined the coalition against him. He failed.
The U.S. government can learn three lessons from this history. First, the United States is not the only player that has failed to organize the Middle East under its own leadership and power. Lots of local players who understand the region much better than the United States have failed as well. Iran, for example, is unlikely to consolidate its regional hegemony either, so Washington should not overreact to Iran's tactical victories.
Second, since the game is played in the region's weaker states, where Tehran has recently done well, Washington should try to strengthen the central governments there. Iraq is a case in point. A year ago, Prime Minister Maliki appeared so weak as to be almost irrelevant, but now he seems to be emerging as the strongman of Iraqi politics. Washington helped him get there, and it makes sense to continue supporting him -- even at the price of tension with America's Kurdish allies (who fear that Maliki's plans for a strong central government will lessen their autonomy). With the United States planning a military withdrawal, American influence over Iraqi politics is a wasting asset, but Washington can still use it to improve, on the margins, the governing capacity of the Iraqi state.
Third, the United States should also pay close attention to the Arab-Israeli peace process. Iran's rulers -- much like Nasser, Khomeini, and Saddam in the past -- use the Palestinian issue to mobilize popular support at home and pressure pro-American governments throughout the region. At the moment, conditions are not propitious for solving the Palestinian question, and the results of the recent Israeli elections make them even less so. Strengthening the Palestinian Authority would be a positive step, but it would require reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah of a sort that seems distant. So working through Syria looks like a more promising approach -- as the Obama administration has apparently recognized, judging from the recent stirrings of diplomatic activity on this front.
Israel and Syria have been negotiating indirectly for some time through Turkey -- although Syria suspended talks during the war in Gaza -- and the outlines of a settlement are clear. If Washington could help broker a Syrian-Israeli deal, it would open up some distance between Tehran and Damascus, refute Iran's argument that confrontation pays, and give new momentum to the idea that the larger Arab-Israeli conflict is moving toward resolution.
Using traditional tools of influence to counter opponents and shift the strategic orientation of secondary regional actors would be a classic move -- and just the sort to get the United States right back in the game.
Copyright © 2002-2009 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
All rights reserved.
Source URL: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64844/f-gregory-gause-iii/the-return-of-the-old-middle-east
regional_issues_2008_17.pdf